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NOTES
White v. Illinois and the "Hearsay Clause" of the Sixth
Amendment
I. INTRODUCTION
Late one evening in April of 1988, a baby-sitter awoke to the scream of the
four-year-old girl left in her charge. Upon investigation, the baby-sitter saw
Randall White, a friend of the child's mother, leave the child's room and exit the
house. When asked by the baby-sitter what had happened, the child replied that
White had "touch[ed] her in the wrong places."' Approximately thirty minutes
later, the mother returned home. The child repeated to her, with a bit more
specificity, what she had told the baby-sitter. The child later told three others
that White had molested her: the investigating officer called to the scene, and
the doctor and nurse who examined the child at the hospital.
White was apprehended and charged with the crimes of residential burglary,
unlawful restraint, and aggravated sexual assault. The prosecution called the
child as a witness, but she experienced emotional difficulty upon taking the stand
and did not testify. The trial court, however, did not find the child to be
unavailable.2 The prosecution then called to the stand the three witnesses to
whom the child.had spoken. Despite White's objections to the hearsay nature
of their testimony, the trial court admitted their accounts of the child's statements
under exceptions to the hearsay rule. White again objected, claiming that the
introduction of the witnesses' testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confront the witnesses against him. Relying on the earlier pronouncement by the
United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts,' White maintained that the
non-testifying declarant must be found unavailable as a condition precedent to
the admission of her hearsay statements. The trial court overruled the objection,
and White was convicted of the charged offenses.'
The state appellate court affirmed White's conviction, and the Illinois
Supreme Court refused writs.5 The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari
in order to resolve the constitutional issue of whether the introduction of the
statements in question violated White's Sixth Amendment right to confronta-
tion.6 Again, White contended that the admission of the hearsay statements
without the requisite finding of declarant unavailability, as per Roberts, violated
Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 739 (1992).
2. id.
3. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980).
4. White, 112 S. Ct. at 739.
5. People v. White, 555 N.E.2d 1241 (Ill. App. Ct.), writ refused. 561 N.E.2d 705 (1990).
6. White v. Illinois, 111 S. Ct. 1681 (1991).
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his confrontation rights. However, reiterating its earlier position taken in United
States v. Inadi,7 the Court stated that Roberts is applicable only to statements
made during the course of prior judicial proceedings. A unanimous Court in
White v. Illinois8 held that the Confrontation Clause does not require that the
prosecution either produce or demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant of
statements otherwise admissible under the medical diagnosis or excited utterance
exceptions to the hearsay rule as a condition precedent to their introduction.
II. JURISPRUDENCE
As one commentator has noted, an "intractable problem in criminal trials is
to reconcile the accused's constitutional right 'to be confronted with the
witnesses against him' with the government's invocation of various exceptions
to the rule against hearsay." 9 After the Court in Pointer v. Texas' ° held the
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation applicable to the states, this problem was
exacerbated by the states' codifications of evidence law and their various
expansions of hearsay exceptions. Notwithstanding the increased frequency of
Confrontation Clause challenges during this period, no clear rules emerged as to
when this Clause allowed the introduction of hearsay.
In Ohio v. Roberts," the Court attempted to provide guidance to the lower
courts in their efforts to define the reach of the Confrontation Clause. At
Roberts' trial, the prosecution introduced the preliminary hearing testimony of
an absent witness. Roberts objected on the grounds that the admission of the
statement violated his confrontation rights, but the judge overruled him. The jury
then found Roberts guilty. The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed Robert's
conviction.
In a manner consistent with prior jurisprudence, Justice Blackmun, writing
for the majority, stated:
[T]he Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the
range of admissible hearsay. First, in conformance with the Framers'
preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes
a rule of necessity. In the usual case (including cases where prior
cross-examination has occurred), the prosecution must either produce,
or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it
wishes to use against the defendant. 2
7. 475 U.S. 387, 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986).
8. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
9. Graham C. Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. Fla. L.
Rev. 207, 207 (1984).
10. 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065 (1965).
11. 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980).
12. Id. at 63, 100 S. Ct. at 2538 (emphasis added).
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In a footnote, the Court explained the phrase "usual case," stating that "[a]
demonstration of unavailability ... is not always required"'' 3 and cited the case
of Dutton v. Evans 4 as an example of a situation where "the utility of trial
confrontation [was] so remote that [the Confrontation Clause] did not require the
prosecution to produce a seemingly available witness." 15
When production is required and the prosecution has successfully demon-
strated the unavailability of the declarant, the "statement is admissible only if it
bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.""16  The Court further explained:
"Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be
excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness."' 17  With this pronouncement, the Court established two presumptions:
one of constitutional admissibility with firmly rooted exceptions and the other of
constitutional inadmissibility with less traditional exceptions.' 8  Since it is
possible for the state to overcome the presumption of inadmissibility by
demonstrating that a statement bears particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,
it logically follows that the defendant also should be allowed to rebut the firmly
rooted presumption by demonstrating that a statement lacks adequate indicia of
reliability.
This conclusion is mandated by Chambers v. Mississippi.'9 The Court in
Chambers held that the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to due process
of law is violated by the operation of any rule of evidence that prohibits a
defendant from presenting and questioning material witnesses.' 0  If the
presumption is conclusive, i.e., if the "hearsay is held to be trustworthy simply
by virtue of falling within a preexisting exception," then "the defendant may be
13. Id. at 63 n.7, 100 S. Ct. at 2538 n.7.
14. 400 U.S. 74, 91 S. Ct. 210 (1970). In Dutton, the trial court admitted a statement made
by an alleged accomplice of Evans' to a fellow prisoner even though the declarant had not been
previously cross-examined nor had he testified at trial. Despite the availability of the declarant, a
plurality of the Court found no Confrontation Clause violation and affirmed Evans' conviction
primarily because of the relatively insignificant impact of the statement.
15. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 n.7, 100 S. Ct. at 2538 n.7.
16. Id. at 66, 100 S. Ct. at 2539.
17. Id.
18. The rebuttable nature of this conclusion, as least as far as the prosecution is concerned, was
acknowledged in the case of Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986). The Court stated
that "[i]n Roberts, we recognized that even if certain hearsay evidence does not fall within a 'firmly
rooted hearsay exception' and is thus presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for Confrontation
Clause purposes, it may nonetheless meet the Confrontation Clause reliability standards if it is
supported by a 'showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' [T]he Clause countenances
only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that 'there is no material departure from the reason
of the general rule."' Id. at 543, 106 S. Ct. at 2063.
19. 410 U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038 (1973).
20. In Chambers, Mississippi evidentiary law prevented defendant from eliciting exculpatory
testimony from certain witnesses.
1993]
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provided with no more than a ritualistic trial-a trial that he enters with the deck
constitutionally stacked against him."'"
In United States v. Inadi,22 the Supreme Court examined, for the first time,
the general unavailability requirement that Roberts held was dictated by
jurisprudence. Inadi involved the issue of whether the statement of a non-
testifying declarant offered under the co-conspirator exemption to the hearsay
rule could be introduced without first demonstrating that the declarant was
unavailable. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court, holding
that such a statement is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable. In
reversing the appellate court's finding that Inadi's confrontation rights were
violated, the Court limited Roberts to its facts, i.e., unavaildbility was required
only in the case of prior testimony.23 However, in doing so, the Court ignored
the fact that unavailability was already required by the prior testimony exception
to the hearsay rule.
Freed from the general unavailability requirement of Roberts, the Court then
analyzed its applicability to the co-conspirator exemption. Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, concluded:
There appears to be little, if any, benefit to be accomplished by the
Court of Appeals' unavailability rule. First, if the declarant either is
unavailable, or is available and produced by the prosecution, the
statements can be introduced anyway .... Second, an unavailability
rule is not likely to produce much testimony that adds anything to the
"truth-determining process" over and above what would be produced
without such a rule.24
However, exemptions to the hearsay rule are theoretically grounded in the
adversarial mode of trial and not on any inherent guarantees of trustworthiness.
As Justice Marshall points out in dissent:
[W]hen the prosecution invokes the co-conspirator exemption to the
hearsay rule, as it does in this case, it is urging the truth of the matters
asserted in the extrajudicial statements. The question here must be
whether we have so much confidence in the factual accuracy of
statements made by conspirators in furtherance of their conspiracy that
we deem the testing of these statements by cross-examination unneces-
sary to guarantee the reliability of a trial's result. 2
21. Stanley A. Goldman, Not So Firmly Rooted: Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66
N.C. L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (1987) (footnote omitted).
22. 475 U.S. 387, 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986).
23. Id. at 394, 106 S. Ct. at 1125.
24. Id. at 396, 106 S. Ct. at 1126-27.
25. Id. at 404, 106 S. Ct. at 1131 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Not surprisingly, the dissent answers this question in the negative. "This
agency theory," Justice Marshall continued, "which even the Advisory
Committee on the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence labeled 'at best a fiction,'
might justify the exemption conferred upon co-conspirator declarations from the
traditional rule against hearsay. But it speaks not to the Confrontation Clause's
concern for reliable factfinding. 26
As the dissent noted, the Inadi "decision [did] nothing to resolve the conflict
among the lower courts as to whether declarations of co-conspirators who are not
present in court for cross-examination must be shown to have particularized
'indicia of reliability' before they can be admitted for substantive purposes
against a criminal defendant.""2 Nevertheless, after Inadi, the unavailability
requirement was no longer applicable to the co-conspirator exemption to the
hearsay rule.
The question of the firmly rooted status of the co-conspirator exemption to
the hearsay rule was answered in Bourjaily v. United States.2" In a rather
circular opinion, the Court first held that the judge may look to the statement
itself in determining the existence of a conspiracy. The Court then stated that
the co-conspirator exemption was a firmly rooted exception, thereby circumvent-
ing the final, post-Inadi Confrontation Clause obstacle to the statement's
admissibility. This conclusion was supported not by analyzing the inherent
reliability of the exemption, but rather by noting the use of the exemption in an
1827 case.' In explaining its deviation from Dutton's particularized inquiry
into reliability, the Court noted that the unorthodox extension of the state's co-
conspirator exemption at issue in that case warranted that approach; Bourjaily
involved no such extension. Thus, despite the theoretical inconsistency of basing
the firmly rooted classification on anything other than reliability, the Court
determined that the mere existence of this exception in early jurisprudence, at
least in this case, was determinative.
In dissent, Justice Blackmun, the author of Roberts, points out that, "unlike
many common law hearsay exceptions, the co-conspirator exemption from
hearsay with its agency rationale was not based primarily upon any particular
guarantees of reliability or trustworthiness. " 30 Justice Blackmun criticizes the
majority for wanting to "have it both ways: it cannot transform the exemption,
as it admittedly does, and then avoid Confrontation Clause concerns by conjuring
up the 'firmly rooted hearsay exception' as some benign genie who will extricate
the Court from its inconsistent analysis."
31
26. Id. at 406, 106 S. Ct. at 1132 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
27. Id. at 401 n.l, 106 S. Ct. at 1129 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
28. 483 U.S. 171, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987).
29. United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460 (1827). is apparently the earliest
confirmed use of this exception in the federal jurisprudence.
30. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 189, 107 S. Ct. at 2786 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 201, 107 S. Ct. at 2792 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Theoretically, the accused should still be afforded the opportunity to rebut
the firmly rooted classification, but the Bour/aily majority suggests that this
presumption is conclusive. "The Confrontation Clause," declared the majority,
"does not require a court to embark on an independent inquiry into the reliability
of statements that satisfy the requirement [of a firmly rooted exception]."32
After Bourjaily, the Court had only examined the co-conspirator exemption and
the prior testimony exception to the hearsay rule. The Rule 803 exceptions, those
in which declarant unavailability was not-mandated by the Federal Rules of
Evidence as a condition precedent to admissibility, would provide the next
opportunity for the Court to test its new interpretation.
This question arose in the case of Idaho v. Wright.33 In reversing the
petitioner's conviction, the Supreme Court applied the two-pronged test of
Roberts to the statement of a three-year-old child admitted under Idaho's
omnibus exception to the hearsay rule. While finding that the child was
technically unavailable, the Court went on to hold that the exception in this case
was not firmly rooted. Moreover, the statement did not bear particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
Although the Court declined to define unavailability, the application of the
Roberts test nevertheless seems to contradict the Court's holding in Inadi that a
finding of unavailability was required only in cases involving prior testimony.
Despite this inconsistency, Wright would seem to indicate that Roberts would at
least apply to exceptions from the hearsay rule (since Inadi involved an
exemption).
Ohio v. Roberts stands for the proposition that, except where production
would be of more than marginal benefit to the defendant, a declarant's
unavailability must be established as a condition precedent to the admissibility
of hearsay statements. Despite language in Roberts, however, which indicated
that the unavailability requirement might apply to the introduction of all hearsay
statements, Inadi held that no general unavailability requirement exists, at least
as to statements admitted under the co-conspirator exemption to the hearsay rule.
So when does the Confrontation Clause, outside the Roberts context, require
a finding of declarant unavailability as a condition precedent to the admission of
hearsay statements of absent declarants? Notwithstanding the response given by
the Court in Wright, the question remained largely unanswered by the time of
White v. Illinois.
III. WHITE ANALYSIS
In arguing that the Confrontation Clause required a finding of unavailability
in the case of the spontaneous utterance and medical testimony exceptions to. the
hearsay rule, petitioner White claimed that the Roberts approach was clearly
32. Id. at 183-84, 110 S. Ct. at 2783.
33. 497 U.S. 805, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
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applicable. Moreover, petitioner argued that Maryland v. Craig' and Coy v.
Iowa35 demonstrated that only a specific showing of necessity will justify any
infringement of a defendant's confrontation rights.36
In response to petitioner's arguments, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, reiterated Inadi's confinement of Roberts to its facts (i.e., to
statements made in the course of prior judicial proceedings). The majority then
distinguishes Craig and Coy on the basis that they both involve issues relating
to in-court testimony by witnesses and not the admissibility of hearsay statements
of non-produced declarants."
The majority next addresses the argument posed by the United States as
amicus curiae in support of Illinois. In contending that White's confrontation
rights are in no way implicated by the admission of the statements in question,
the United States argued that the original purpose of the Confrontation Clause
was to prevent the prosecution of defendants "through the presentation of ex
parte affidavits, without the affiants ever being produced at trial .... Thus,
unless the statement is in the character of an ex parte affidavit, i.e., made for the
principal purpose of accusing the defendant, the declarant is not a "witness
against" the defendant, and the Confrontation Clause does not apply. Since the
child's statements in White do not fit this functional characterization of an ex
parte affidavit, the Confrontation Clause should not apply to the question of their
admissibility.
This is essentially the position taken by the concurring opinion with the
qualification that Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, rejects the functional
approach due to its inherent conceptual unmanageability. According to their
concurrence, "Attempts to draw a line between statements made in contemplation
of legal proceedings and those not so made would entangle the courts in a
multitude of difficulties. Few types of statements could be 'categorically
34. 497 U.S. 836, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
35. 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
36. Both Craig and Coy involved the question of what in-court procedures are permitted by the
Confrontation Clause to protect the psychological well-being of child abuse victims. In Craig, the
Court validated the use of closed-circuit television in light of the trial court's determination that the
child would suffer emotional harm if required to testify in open court in the presence of the
defendant. In Coy, the Court invalidated a statute which allowed a child to testify from behind a
screen without any requirement of potential trauma. In both cases the defendants were able to cross-
examine the children, yet the Court still held that to excuse face-to-face confrontation the Sixth
Amendment requires that a special need be shown. Thus, White argued, a necessity requirement is
certainly mandated in the case of hearsay statements where the defendant is denied the opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant.
37. "Coy and Craig involved only the question of what in-court procedures are constitutionally
required to guarantee a defendant's confrontation right once a witness is testifying. Such a question
is quite separate from that of what requirements the Confrontation Clause imposes as a predicate for
the introduction of out-of-court declarations. Coy and Craig did not speak to the latter question."
White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 743-44 (1992).
38. Id. at 738.
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characterized as within or without a defendant's confrontation rights."39 For
instance, the child's statements presently at issue could arguably be classified as
either.
For this reason, the concurring opinion suggests a more limited interpretation
whereby a defendant's confrontation rights would be implicated only by the the
introduction of formalized testimonial materials such as prior testimony or
confessions by third parties. This approach, the opinion states, is not only in line
with the historical purposes of the Clause, but is also reconcilable with the
jurisprudence. 4° Moreover, this approach would avoid the reliability analysis
of Roberts, since this is more appropriately a due process concern and has
neither textual nor historical support.4'
Despite the conceptual cogency and ease of application offered by this
bright-line solution, it is summarily dismissed by the -majority as coming "too
late in the day to warrant reexamination .... "-42 This approach would virtually
eliminate the Confrontation Clause's role in regulating the admission of hearsay
statements, a role established by the jurisprudence as early as 1895. 4"
Concluding that the Confrontation Clause applies to the admission of the
statements at hand, the majority then turns to the question of whether the Clause
requires a finding of declarant unavailability. In examining why the Court
refused to apply this requirement in Inadi, the opinion isolates two principal
factors. First, the evidentiary significance of statements admitted under the co-
conspirator exemption is unlikely to be replicated at trial. Second, there is little
to be gained by an unavailability rule since the statements will come in whether
the declarant is unavailable or is available and produced for trial.44 Chief
Justice Rehnquist states, "while an unavailability rule would therefore do little
to improve the accuracy of factfinding, it is likely to impose substantial
additional burdens on the factfinding process."45
39. Id. at 747.
40. Id. Justice Thomas notes that virtually all of the Confrontation Clause cases involved the
introduction of either prior testimony or confessions.
41. As Justice Thomas states, "Reliability is more properly a due process concern. There is
no reason to strain the text of the Confrontation Clause to provide criminal defendants with a
protection that due process already provides them." Id.
42. Id. at 741.
43. In 1895, the Court decided the case of Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 15 S .Ct. 337
(1895). The Court held that the Confrontation Clause permitted the introduction of the cross-
examined testimony of witnesses from a defendant's prior trial who had since died. According to
the majority in White, this result "was justified not because the hearsay testimony was unlike an ex
pare affidavit, but because it came within an established exception to the hearsay rule." White v.
Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 741 (1992).
44. Chief Justice Rehnquist observes that the lack of an unavailability requirement will not
prejudice the defendant, since the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause and evidentiary
rules allow a defendant to treat a witness as hostile. These devices should adequately preserve the
defendant's ability to question hearsay declarants at trial.
45. White, 112 S. Ct. at 742.
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The majority then finds that both of these observations "apply with full force
to the case at hand." 6 Unlike the prior testimony exception at issue in Roberts,
in the cases of the medical testimony and the spontaneous utterance exceptions
to the hearsay rule, both are spoken under circumstances which are thought to
insure their reliability. These circumstances would be impossible to replicate in
the courtroom. Moreover, requiring the production of the declarant in this
situation would add little to the statement itself while unnecessarily burdening the
prosecution with having to keep track of each declarant whose statements could
possibly be of use. These considerations, which justified dispensing with the
unavailability requirement in Inadi, serve the same end in White.
Having decided that the Confrontation Clause mandates no unavailability
requirement in the case of these two exceptions, the opinion finally addresses the
issue of reliability. Are the statements sufficiently trustworthy to satisfy the
confrontation rights of the defendant? In paraphrasing from Roberts, the Court
holds that "where proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to
come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation
Clause is satisfied. 47
To answer this question, the Court relies in part on the earlier examination
of the probative attributes of the two exceptions. These attributes, when
combined with the respective pedigrees of the two exceptions and their
widespread acceptance among the states, cause the majority to conclude that both
are, without a doubt, firmly rooted. Thus, both satisfy the sole requirement of
the Confrontation Clause in this case, that of reliability.
IV. CONCLUSION
In deciding White v. Illinois, the majority purports to retain the Roberts view
when defining the function of the Confrontation Clause in regulating the
admission of hearsay. The Court acknowledges that the Clause promotes a
preference for face-to-face confrontation whenever it serves a useful purpose.
However, if it serves no such end, thus eliminating the preference, the Clause
still demands that the hearsay be sufficiently reliable to justify its admission.
The majority's justifications for excusing the preference for face-to-face
confrontation in the case of the two exceptions in question in White also apply
to most of the other Rule 803 hearsay exceptions. Since these exceptions
necessarily involve circumstances which are impossible to replicate in the
courtroom and which serve to indicate the reliability of the statement, they
should satisfy the White criteria. Thus, White appears to indicate that the
Confrontation Clause will rarely require the prosecution to produce a declarant
or to demonstrate his unavailability prior to admitting his statements under Rule
803.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 743.
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Clearly then, the main function of the Clause in regulating the admission of
this class of hearsay exceptions is to provide for the reliability analysis. In an
effort to avoid a case-by-case examination of each statement, Roberts created the
firmly rooted exception which allows a court to infer reliability without more.
Expanding on this concept, the White Court finds that two of the more
questionable hearsay exceptions are firmly rooted.4" Considering the factors
isolated in this determination, the majority again formulates an approach which
seems to justify conferring firmly rooted status on most of the remaining Rule
803 exceptions.
Application of the reasoning of White to the other Rule 803 exceptions
demonstrates that all firmly rooted exceptions could prove to be impervious to
Confrontation Clause challenges. This result, in effect, gives prosecutors the
choice of foregoing the live testimony of an otherwise available witness if his
extrajudicial statements fall within a firmly rooted exception, thus forcing the
defendant to rely on the Compulsory Process Clause if he wishes to cross-
examine the declarant.
In addressing this allocation of the burden of production of witnesses to the
defendant, Justice Marshall has noted that "only a lawyer without trial experience
would suggest that the limited right to impeach one's own witness is the
equivalent of that right to immediate cross-examination which has always been
regarded as the greatest safeguard of American trial procedure."4 9
Nevertheless, the Court has spoken, and the White opinion gives no reason
to believe that the list of firmly rooted exceptions exempted from an unavailabili-
ty requirement will not continue to grow. But scenarios involving prosecutorial
abuse of this discretion are not difficult to envisage. For instance, given the
choice between calling as a witness an unpredictable or particularly unsavory
declarant and a respectable and objective member of the medical profession who
could testify to the same end, the prosecutor would likely choose the safety of
the latter course of action. In light of the narrow applicability of the Confronta-
tion Clause in the hearsay area, the Due Process Clause and state constitutional
provisions should be expected to emerge more frequently in defense challenges
to such conduct.'0
Hansel M. Harlan
48. Since the exception for excited utterances draws its reliability justification from the
spontaneity of the statement, that a considerable amount of time had passed between the alleged
incident and the child's utterance undermines the exception's rationale. Statements admitted pursuant
to the medical testimony exception, which draws its justification from the belief that the declarant
is unlikely to lie for fear of misdiagnosis, lose their theoretical justification when spoken by a four-
year-old child. Moreover, many states take the position that statements identifying the alleged
perpetrator of a criminal act are not admissible under this exception because they are not relevant to
diagnosis.
49. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 410, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1134 (1986) (Marshall. J..
dissenting) (quoting New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d. 297. 305 (1945)).
50. The Louisiana Constitution, for example, provides, in pertinent part, "An accused is entitled
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him ...." La. Const. art. 1, §16 (emphasis
added).
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